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Abstract: How does culture positively or negatively influence low-carbon energy 8 
transitions?  How can insights gained about cultural influences guide local, national and 9 
global energy planners and policymakers as they navigate and try to stimulate transitions, 10 
particularly during a period of rapid technology change?  This Review examines the 11 
influence of culture on a selection of low-carbon technologies, behavioral practices, and 12 
synergies with different dimensions of sustainability. Based on a typology of low-carbon 13 
technology and behavior, we explore the cultural dimensions of four specific case studies: 14 
eco-driving, ride-sharing, automated vehicles, and whole house retrofits.  While the cases 15 
discussed are mainly oriented toward the low-carbon, environmental dimension of 16 
sustainability, they also demonstrate the relationship between culture and the equally 17 
important social and economic dimensions of sustainability. The Review concludes with 18 
policy and research recommendations for those seeking to analyze, understand, develop, 19 
demonstrate and deploy low-carbon innovations, practices, and technologies for sustainable 20 
energy transitions.  21 
 22 
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Introduction 25 
In this paper, we review culture and a selection of low-carbon technologies, 26 
behavioral practices, and synergies with different dimensions of sustainability.   We ask: how 27 
does culture influence—positively or negatively—low-carbon energy transitions?  How can 28 
insights gained about culture guide research agendas, as well as climate and energy planning 29 
and policymaking?  We take culture as reflection of local societal practices, beliefs and 30 
behavioral routines, as well as their socio-material or sociotechnical manifestations.  This 31 
congeals into a definition of culture as the norms, practices, and material artifacts in a 32 
society—at any scale, from individuals and groups to organizations and even nations, a view 33 
that is consistent with recent research on energy and culture.1 2 3 Although various definitions 34 
of energy transitions, low-carbon energy transitions, and sustainable energy transitions 35 
populate the literature,4 5 6 7 8 9 we define it concretely as changing the sources or uses of 36 
energy technologies or services that ultimately result in lower greenhouse gas (GHG) 37 
emissions.  38 
In this Review, we address these global sustainability concerns through a focus on 39 
how culture can complicate, or catalyze, attempts at promoting more efficient, more 40 
sustainable, and often more affordable forms of mobility as well as energy use in homes and 41 
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buildings.  We offer a qualitative and narrative review of the evidence leveraging data 42 
collected across many different disciplines. These include energy and transport studies as 43 
well as anthropology, area studies, geography, political science, psychology, and sociology, 44 
to name a few.  This synthesis of a wide range of studies shows that culture can operate as a 45 
salient but often-unacknowledged barrier or enabler to low-carbon transitions as well as 46 
sustainability transitions more broadly.   47 
The Review explores culture through the lens of four comparative low-carbon, 48 
sustainability transitions summarized in Figure 1. As a guiding theoretical lens, we build on 49 
and extend a body of work suggesting that low-carbon transitions and innovations can cut 50 
across both incremental and radical technical orientations, and modest versus substantial 51 
changes in user behavior modes (or social practices).10 11 As Figure 1 indicates, we explore 52 
culture and its impacts on the adoption of ridesharing (technologically incremental but radical 53 
in terms of practices), automated vehicles (technologically radical and radical in terms of 54 
practices), whole house retrofits (technologically radical but modest in terms of changes in 55 
practices), and eco-driving (incremental technologically with modest changes in practices).  56 
Figure 1: A technological and behavioral typology of low-carbon transitions  57 
 58 
Source: Authors  59 
As Figure 1 reveals, our cultural approach includes social practices as well as 60 
particular energy using systems and devices that are the material artifacts of cultural 61 
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dynamics.  It therefore straddles the debate in social science about the role of agency, which 62 
sees actors as free-willed subjects, and structure, which sees the external constraints actors or 63 
institutions face.12  Rather than considering culture as the primary result of either agency or 64 
structure, we view it as the mechanism that mediates between agency and structure, with the 65 
materiality of energy systems or infrastructure shaping this mediation.13  Moreover, the 66 
approach differs from pure practice theory, which takes as the unit of analysis interrelated 67 
human, material and discursive elements of practice (e.g.  bathing, cleaning, cooking)14 15. 68 
We consider how the cultural dynamics of low-carbon transitions are shaped not only by user 69 
practices, but also by the technologies and environments that co-exist and co-evolve with 70 
practices.10 This is a particularly relevant framework for our consideration of radical 71 
technical innovations, such as autonomous vehicles, where the machine or technology itself 72 
takes on culturally determined behaviors.16 73 
Eco-driving (technologically incremental and modest change in practices) 74 
Our first example of the interplay between culture and low-carbon transitions centers 75 
on the automobile, which has long been identified as a functional technology (for providing 76 
mobility) as well as a symbolic and cultural one (for expressing social status and cultural 77 
identity). 17 18 19 In particular, we examine culture and eco-driving, a term meant to 78 
encompass activities that make driving a passenger vehicle more efficient or more 79 
environmentally friendly.  We classified this as a technologically incremental change (as it 80 
still involves cars or simple alternatives such as cycling) that requires just a modest change in 81 
practices (such as accelerating or decelerating the vehicle).  82 
Eco-driving is often used interchangeably with “economical driving” or “fuel-83 
efficient” driving.20  Eco-driving can be categorized into three types: strategic decisions such 84 
as vehicle selection and maintenance, tactical decisions such as route planning and weight, 85 
and operational decisions such as driving style.21  Practically, the major factors that enable 86 
eco-driving include gentler acceleration and deceleration, smoother driving styles, minimal 87 
use of braking, and the avoidance of excessive speed or idling. 22 The social and 88 
environmental benefits of eco-driving are diffuse, including maximizing fuel economy, 89 
reducing  GHGs, and mitigating air pollution. One study noted that 6–18% of eco-drivers 90 
reduced their speed and accelerations/decelerations, 9–20% lowered their engine speed, and 91 
5–14% minimize the number of stops.23 92 
Culture, expressed in terms of social practices and beliefs grounded in altruism rather 93 
than egoism, and environmentalism rather than materialism, has a significant positive 94 
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relationship with eco-driving.  For instance, in terms of strategic eco-driving and vehicle 95 
selection, one study of the early adopters of the Toyota Prius found that owners were willing 96 
to pay a premium price for a non-luxury vehicle that had a smaller trunk, sluggish engine, and 97 
standard cloth seats because it attained excellent fuel economy and symbolized a green 98 
identity. 24  Through a series of experiments, the authors found that adopting a Prius signified 99 
altruism and a willingness to incur costs for the benefits of others, allowing an owner to 100 
brand him or herself as “prosocial individual.” 25 Such prosocial behavior was believed to 101 
bring significant non-monetary benefits such as being viewed as more environmentally 102 
conscious, trustworthy, and even desirable as friend, ally, and/or romantic partner. Such 103 
adopters of the Prius especially wanted to be seen out and around the town shopping in their 104 
green car.  Follow up work has confirmed that “eco cars” have status and symbolic value 105 
across diverse contexts, and often marks the adopters as someone who is educated, informed, 106 
healthy, and environmentally focused. 26 107 
Research has emphasized more tactical and operational forms of eco-driving, 108 
especially driving style, which can themselves become a way of expressing culture or 109 
reflecting cultural practices related to what is known as “driving culture”27. In Spain, 110 
researchers focused on embedding a culture of eco-driving through a six-hour training course 111 
and active monitoring of driving patterns. The Spanish drivers were noted to adopt more eco-112 
driving practices after training and this reduced their fuel consumption by almost 7%.  The 113 
Spanish driver’s vehicles also were observed to have 16% lower revolutions per minute 114 
(RPM) on average, 4% lower average speed, 37% lower acceleration and 46% less 115 
deceleration.28 116 
In certain situations, eco-driving culture can even spillover into the abandonment of 117 
the car itself in preference for more sustainable forms of mobility. There is evidence that 118 
those belonging to Generation Y (those who were born between 1980 and the early 2000s) 119 
are more environmentally aware of their transport choices, less interested in driving or 120 
owning cars, and more willing to consider alternative forms of mobility.29  Particularly in 121 
New Zealand, environmental consciousness and concern associate with people preferring 122 
lower-carbon transport modes, and awareness of the environmental impact of transport 123 
shapes mobility choices.30 They are also more conscious of the financial costs of driving, and 124 
thus, we would argue, to some of the economic costs to driving inefficiently.  In the 125 
Netherlands, an environmental culture connected to egalitarianism but also active transport 126 
has resulted in a strong convention in favor of cycling rather than driving automobiles.31 32 127 
Other research has shown how different national cultures spillover into differing cultures of 128 
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road safety, with Japanese drivers more strongly emphasizing risk reduction and safe driving, 129 
whereas drivers in the United States prioritize individual freedom which leads to greater risks 130 
and more frequent crashes.33  131 
By contrast, behaviors such as tailgating, speeding, traffic weaving, red-light running, 132 
and blocking the passing lane are known as “aggressive driving.”34 These behaviors have 133 
significant and negative implications on energy use and therefore climate change. In 134 
Germany, people’s driving styles and route choices have a major impact on exhaust 135 
emissions from vehicles. Portable Emissions Measurement Systems have shown that 136 
aggressive driving can culminate in much higher emissions than those from normal driving: 137 
20–40% higher for carbon dioxide and 50–255% higher or nitrogen oxide.35 In Portugal, we 138 
see similar results, with aggressive driving leading to increased energy consumption 139 
(compared to non-aggressive driving) of more than 200% and emissions about 330% 140 
higher.36  In the United States, aggressive driving is estimated to lower overall fuel economy 141 
by 15 to 30% for highway driving and by 10 to 40% for city or urban driving.37  142 
How does culture promote aggressive driving practices and therefore run counter to 143 
eco-driving?   One cultural norm connects masculinity and macho-ness and aggression with 144 
the “need for speed.” 38 In the United Sates, perhaps due to such conventions and norms, men 145 
are more often impatient and frustrated when driving, more likely to waste energy by 146 
needlessly revving engines, more likely to display evidence of road rage at traffic lights, and 147 
more frequently involved in traffic accidents.39  These aggressive elements of driving could 148 
be prevalent around the world wherever cultures of masculinity, strength, or aggression are 149 
strong.  One study even referred to such aggressive drivers as “monsters in metal cocoons.”40   150 
In France, these norms of masculinity and assertiveness spawn cultures of “speed” where 151 
more than half (56%) of young drivers, many of them male, report that they speed as a 152 
habit.41  Psychological studies of these young French speeders suggest they habitually speed 153 
due to strong social pressure from their peers in addition to enhanced perceptions of being 154 
able to control time while they speed. 42  Similarly, another study in Denmark concluded that 155 
perceptions of speeding among young drivers were strongly influenced by peers compared to 156 
other predictors such as education or history of automobile crashes.43  In Australia, speeding 157 
occurs across both genders, with women reporting that they speed because of familiarity with 158 
roads, perhaps for reasons of comfort and habit, but men speed because of peer pressure and a 159 
stated need to fit in with friends, for reasons of conformity.44   One meta-analysis also found 160 
that anger affects younger drivers more frequently and more negatively, as people generally 161 
have an improved ability to control their anger as they get older.45   A final meta-analysis 162 
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correlated “sensation seeking,” or those with cultural orientations towards varied, novel, and 163 
intense new experiences and the willingness to take risks, with driving practices.46 It found 164 
strong positive correlations between sensation seeking and impulsiveness, risky driving, 165 
driving errors, and aggressive driving.  166 
 Conversely, while young drivers may seek risks and aggressive driving styles, many 167 
elderly drivers do the opposite, and are risk averse.  Elderly drivers, for example, are known 168 
to be more cautious when merging into traffic, for being more aware of their limitations as 169 
drivers, and for having a style that is more considerate.47 48  In the United Kingdom, older 170 
drivers were even found to be involved in fewer driving fatalities compared to younger 171 
drivers.49  172 
Other work has emphasized how being cultural pressures to be “macho”, or perceived 173 
as strong, dominant, and in control, leads people to speed.  As evidence, in Germany young 174 
men are overrepresented by a wide margin in road traffic accidents, accounting for almost a 175 
third (30%) of all accidents but representing only 8% of the adult population.50  Interviews 176 
with such drivers suggest that “macho identity” creates inclinations of young men towards 177 
risk taking—speeding is fun because it is dangerous.51  In the United Kingdom, cultural 178 
norms of assertiveness or macho-ness can even influence the driving styles of those using 179 
hybrid electric vehicles. Specifically, some drivers have reported recharging their vehicles 180 
not by plugging in to charge via an electrical socket at home or at work, but by aggressively 181 
running the internal combustion engine and then braking hard, which taps into the re-182 
generative braking system to “charge” the vehicle.52  This wastes energy, increases wear and 183 
tear on the vehicle, and can entirely offset any carbon savings.53 184 
Ridesharing (technologically incremental and substantial change in practices) 185 
Although enabled by the proliferation of internet-connected mobile devices, 186 
ridesharing resides in the technologically incremental category (as they again still involve 187 
cars as we know them today) but requires more radical changes in practices (such as traveling 188 
by a schedule and sharing a vehicle with others). Shared mobility is defined by the Society of 189 
Automotive Engineers as the shared use of a vehicle, motorcycle, scooter, bicycle, or other 190 
travel mode that provides users with short-term access on an as-needed basis. 54 It involves 191 
the sharing of physical assets (i.e. sequential sharing of an asset as in peer-to-peer [P2P] 192 
carsharing or bikesharing), and the sharing of rides (i.e. concurrent sharing of an asset by 193 
multiple people as in carpooling and ridesplitting). Shared mobility services follow a number 194 
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of different services models, including membership-based, non-membership-based, P2P, and 195 
for-hire. 196 
Carsharing (or a “car club” in the UK and Europe) involves the user paying an hourly 197 
(and/or mileage-based) rate to pick up a vehicle, use it, and return it somewhere. 55  198 
Ridesharing most accurately refers to rides or trips that are shared between different 199 
individuals and paid separately. 56 Although ridesharing has become somewhat synonymous 200 
with ridehailing (or ridesourcing) in everyday language, the two are distinct. Ridehailing is 201 
typically defined as an app-based platform that allows users to request for a ride from a (at 202 
least semi-) professional driver working for a transportation network company (TNC) — with 203 
Uber and Lyft being the most well-known TNCs and the dominant ones in the United 204 
States.55 Ridehailing services are not truly “ridesharing” services unless they exclusively 205 
offer shared rides. Similarly, “pooled” ridehailing is not carpooling since the latter generally 206 
refers to ridesharing with a non-professional driver. Nonetheless, ridehailing is depicted as 207 
one of the most rapidly growing, disruptive forms of shared mobility57 and it represents an 208 
extremely important opportunity for growth in ridesharing. The underlying technology and 209 
infrastructure for dynamic ridesharing is rapidly evolving and ridesharing companies are 210 
already providing such services58.  211 
Ridesharing, in turn, can lead to significant material, energy and emissions reductions 212 
by minimizing the ownership of automobiles and maximizing their utilization, particularly 213 
when they are used for carpooling or ridesplitting (e.g. UberPOOL and Lyft Line) rather than 214 
taxi service replacement. 56, 59,  60When integrated with active travel and mass transit, 215 
ridehailing, and all forms of shared mobility, also support walking and healthier lifestyles.61  216 
While ridehailing is rapidly building a global reputation, cultural nuances in personal 217 
transportation makes ridehailing a service business that requires tailoring to local context. It 218 
is therefore not surprising that local ridehailing companies such as Didi Chung in China, 219 
Yandex.Taxi in Russia, Go-Jek in Indonesia, Grab in Singapore and Ola in India have 220 
succeeded despite the fact that each was a latecomer to ridehailing relative to Uber, which 221 
was founded in 2009 and since has had a strong desire to expand its software platform 222 
internationally.62   223 
The successes of Careem in the Middle East and both Grab and Go-Jek in Southeast 224 
Asia have become case studies of competition through cultural awareness 3,63,64,65,66. In Saudi 225 
Arabia, Careem tailored its approach to the Saudi market by training drivers to follow 226 
cultural norms about not conversing with female Saudi passengers and not looking at them in 227 
the rear view mirror. This cultural awareness enabled Careem to tap into a large Saudi female 228 
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population.64  Furthermore, Careem has sought to change the image and perceptions of 229 
drivers for hire across the GCC countries, calling them “Captains” to impart a greater level of 230 
respect and prestige for the job—and engaging with the cultural pride of Arabs to encourage 231 
to become Careem drivers.67  232 
In the Philippines and in Indonesia traffic, Grab and Go-Jek launched successful 233 
motorcycle ridehailing services with recognition that sharing a motorbike is widely accepted 234 
and transport via motorcycles is a norm due to severe traffic congestion and the relative ease 235 
with which motorcycles can navigate the traffic68.  Although Uber did launch operations in 236 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia, including a motorcycle ridehailing service to compete 237 
with those of Grab and Go-Jek, the company eventually acquired Careem and sold its 238 
Southeast Asia operations to Grab. Uber was simply too late in adjusting to cultural factors to 239 
compete head on with the local ridehailing companies. 240 
Despite Careem paving the way for the growth of ridesharing in the Middle East, in 241 
the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) the norm is private car ownership with 242 
97% of residents traveling predominantly by private car. Further, 32% of GCC residents are 243 
unwilling to share a car with others to go to work, which is exactly twice the average 244 
percentage of countries across the Middle East and North Africa region. 69  This aversion to 245 
ridesharing limits the potential for pooled ridesharing in the GCC and hence limits the 246 
potential regional environmental benefits from ridehailing. A key aspect of the individualistic 247 
car ownership culture in the UAE and across the GCC is the expression of class and wealth, 248 
which is a known automobility frame that is counter to ride sharing.70 Such views on sharing 249 
rides are not limited to the GCC, however. In Demark ride-sharing in the form of car-pooling 250 
faces cultural barriers that revolve around notions of safety, social awkwardness, and social 251 
exclusion.71 Riding with strangers is seen as unsafe, the car is viewed as a private and 252 
personal thing that strangers are not invited into, and private cars are still associated with 253 
strong cultural notions of freedom and emotional satisfaction.72   254 
Automated vehicles (technologically radical and substantial change in practices)  255 
Automated vehicles (AVs) serve as our final automobility case and fall at the opposite 256 
end of the technology/practice spectrum relative to eco-driving, as they require a radical 257 
change in practices (cars no longer even have drivers for full automation) and very advanced 258 
technology (further enhancements in automation, artificial intelligence, robotics and 259 
manufacturing). In this paper, we follow the SAE International classification system for 260 
automated vehicles73, which is based on six increasing levels of autonomy ranging from 261 
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Level 0 with no autonomous driving function to Level 5 with no human intervention required 262 
(see Figure 2). The radical AV technology to which we refer is Levels 4 and 5 (“fully 263 
automated”). 264 
Figure 2: Levels of Partial and Full Automation in Vehicular Mobility  265 
 266 
Source: SAE 2016.  267 
 268 
The AV case is closely related to our eco-driving and shared mobility cases given that 269 
the future of personal mobility is often linked with the broad deployment of AVs that are 270 
shared and electric (EV).74 75  While the sustainability benefits of car sharing and EVs 271 
powered by renewable electricity are clear, the implications of vehicle autonomy are less 272 
obvious although linked to key dimensions of mobility, including safety, congestion, GHG 273 
emissions and energy consumption.76  Taiebat et al. reviewed 42 studies that assessed the 274 
energy, environment and sustainability benefits of AV technology in various combinations of 275 
four dimensions - vehicle, transportation system, urban system, and society. They find that 276 
AV-supported transformations at all four dimensions can provide significant low-carbon 277 
transition benefits. 77 The studies reviewed indicate that at the vehicle dimension, AVs can 278 
achieve fuel savings between 2% and 25%, and occasionally as high as 40%, based on 279 
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designs oriented toward energy efficiency. However, the long run, net effect of AV 280 
technology on energy consumption and GHG emissions is highly uncertain and depends 281 
significantly on AV interactions with the transportation system, urban system, and society. 282 
Marletto reviewed 20 studies concerning the potential future impact of AVs and found that 283 
while increased road safety is nearly universally agreed, the magnitude and type of impact 284 
(i.e. positive or negative) on congestion, GHG emissions and energy consumption will 285 
depend on a broad range of factors78. These factors include transport mode (e.g. car, bus, 286 
lorry, train), level of automation (1 to 5), vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and/or vehicle-to-287 
infrastructure (V2I) connection, propulsion technology (e.g. internal combustion; hybrid 288 
electric, full electric), transport business model (e.g. owned, rented/shared or scheduled) and 289 
usage (longhaul, suburban, urban, commuting) and regulatory regime (e.g. defined speed 290 
limits, restricted areas of use).  291 
Specifically concerning low-carbon transition, automated light-duty and heavy-duty 292 
vehicles can either decrease or increase total road transport energy, with the ultimate outcome 293 
depending on how autonomy changes demand for travel and driving practices.79  The 294 
conclusion that broad adoption of AVs can either help or hurt a low-carbon transition has 295 
been confirmed in many other studies and reviews as well 80,81,82,83. While the potential 296 
benefit of AVs to low-carbon energy transition is somewhat ambiguous, nearly all of the 297 
leading global automobile manufacturers are actively pursuing the commercial introduction 298 
by 2020 of vehicles that are not just autonomous, but also electric and shared84. This is a 299 
promising sign for realizing the potential low-carbon benefits of AVs.  300 
In the case of AV adoption, culture is a critical aspect of both technology adoption as 301 
well as technology performance.  Several authors have considered how cultural factors 302 
support or hinder AV adoption.85,86 The results suggest that enthusiasm for driving and its 303 
social dynamics reduce interest in AV adoption while enthusiasm for the adoption of new 304 
technologies increases interest in AV adoption. Concerns for safety (i.e. fewer crashes) and 305 
the environment (i.e. lower vehicle emissions, better fuel economy) are driving forces for the 306 
adoption of AVs. Potential legal and ethical issues in case of collisions, privacy (i.e. the 307 
disclosure of trip data to technology companies), cybersecurity, and hacking are barriers for 308 
the adoption of AVs. Demographically, men that are young to middle age and with high 309 
incomes are likely early adopters and mainstream users of AVs as are disabled people 310 
currently unable to drive55.  311 
For AVs, however, cultural acceptance of the mode of transportation is not the only 312 
consideration for successful adoption. Rather, algorithms in the software guiding the 313 
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automation can be just as important.  The vehicle software contains artificial intelligence (AI) 314 
machine learning algorithms that enable AVs to make real-time decisions based on the 315 
information they receive from sensors that perceive the environment around them. These 316 
algorithms are “trained” to recognize and interpret elements of the environment, such as road 317 
signs, pedestrians and vehicles, and then take actions that are “appropriate” based on context.    318 
The process of AI training, however, can result in unintended biases87 that are 319 
difficult to remedy and ultimately reflect varying degrees of racial, gender and/or religious 320 
discrimination.  Research has shown, for example, that AVs trained using machine learning 321 
techniques are likely to have biases in detecting pedestrians based on skin tone (better 322 
recognition performance for people with lighter skin tones) and patterns of dress (better 323 
recognition performance for those dressed in “Western” clothing compared to traditional 324 
“Arab” clothing). 3,88  Such machine biases could also result in an AV not recognizing or 325 
misinterpreting the cultural nuances of pedestrian body language, resulting in pedestrian 326 
injuries and fatalities. 89, 90  In addition to issues with static and active pedestrian recognition, 327 
the “appropriate” action for an AV to take in a pedestrian encounter differs across cultures. 328 
The “morale machine” experiment, for instance, has shown a pattern of distinct cultural 329 
preferences for privileging the lives of some groups or classes of people over others in the 330 
case of an unavoidable AV collision with pedestrians. 91 331 
Because culture is a driving force in both AV adoption and performance of the 332 
technology, a paradox arises whereby societies most favorable towards AVs may not be 333 
culturally compatible with their use. For instance, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ranks 334 
very high in KPMG’s AV Readiness Index92 and has a favorable view of AV adoption. 93 335 
However, AV biases that are a byproduct of system training could put darker skinned Arab 336 
pedestrians in the UAE at greater risk of not being recognized as pedestrians by AVs. This 337 
has raised UAE public concerns about driverless cars being “racist” towards Arabs. 94 338 
Further, the AV paradox does not just pertain to the Arab world.  KPMG has ranked the 339 
Netherlands as one of the most favorable countries for the use of AVs in all of Europe, given 340 
the stated positive public perceptions there of AV technology. 95  However, the Netherlands’ 341 
strong cycling culture and extremely high number of bicycles per capita creates a dilemma 342 
for AV deployment since bicycles are one of the most significant detection challenges for 343 
AVs.96  344 
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Whole house retrofits (technologically radical and modest change in practices) 345 
Whole house retrofits are a departure from the mobility theme and serve as our final 346 
case. They exist in the radical technology quadrant (for again requiring entirely new 347 
configurations of technologies) but reflect modest changes in practice (as many times the 348 
functional attributes of the household remain the same).  Whole house retrofits focus on 349 
redesigning homes, especially space heating (in Northern countries) or cooling (in tropical 350 
countries), to reduce their energy demand and to be more energy-efficient.  This is often 351 
accomplished through the integration of multiple technologies at once, including fabric 352 
insulation, heat pumps and mechanical ventilation heat recovery, energy-efficient lighting, 353 
energy-efficient appliances, improved windows, and even integration with renewable energy 354 
(such as solar panels and energy storage).97  355 
The general benefits of retrofits can be diffuse and vast.  One review of rationales for 356 
retrofits identified environmental benefits such as displaced carbon, medical benefits such as 357 
improved occupant health, economic benefits such as revitalized local enterprises, and equity 358 
benefits such as reduced fuel poverty.98  Retrofits can also produce private benefits to 359 
households, including improved property values, and result in major savings on energy bills 360 
along with enhanced thermal comfort.99 361 
Culture, as with the other cases, can be a motivator for undertaking retrofits.  One 362 
study, for example, compares British and Indian cultural perceptions of energy efficiency and 363 
retrofits, seeking to contrast how an individualistic culture (Britain) differed, if at all, from a 364 
more collectivist one (India).100 The study notes how traditional notions of Vastu, or beliefs 365 
about the science of architecture, speak to members of the Indian diaspora about the proper 366 
placement of doors, windows, and walls, all with a goal of seeking to harmonize energy 367 
flows.  This means for Indians, the orientation and efficiency of a building attains a level of 368 
importance above and beyond that of English respondents without any such beliefs.  369 
Australia has been credited for having a national “love affair” with retrofits due to a 370 
“renovation culture” that prioritizes style and aesthetics.101   There, many homes have 371 
implemented retrofits aimed at being low carbon or even “net zero energy,” defined as a 372 
building with zero net energy consumption throughout the year.  Australians have often 373 
installed small-scale rooftop solar photovoltaic panels because they are seen as more modern, 374 
and overall more beautiful.  House retrofit activity in Australia has increased by 150% since 375 
2010, with 10% of Australian property owners undertaking major renovations (of more than 376 
$10,000) in the period 2012 to 2014, with the average amount spent of $48,000. 102 The stated 377 
motivations for these retrofits, in addition to saving money, are increased comfort, increased 378 
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value for the property, and, critically, having a home that looks more modern and stylish. As 379 
the study concluded, “the core goals of occupant-driven renovations appear to be focused on 380 
spatial, functional and aesthetic considerations.” 381 
 The positive cultural dynamics of retrofits contrast with negative dynamics apparent 382 
in Ireland, England, and Japan.  In Ireland, one evaluation of the Better Energy Homes 383 
scheme concluded that “culture also has a large effect” in the uptake of retrofits, but in the 384 
other direction, towards the abandonment of applications.103  The study noted that stress, 385 
disruption, and notions of cleanliness and dirt (not wanting a house to be temporarily dirty) 386 
all increase the likelihood of a retrofit being abandoned.  387 
In the United Kingdom, notions of aesthetics and cultural heritage stand in the way of 388 
retrofits, with many households preferring to preserve old buildings and not upgrade to newer 389 
technologies of building facades.104 Research has shown that British households are reluctant 390 
to compromise the aesthetics of their home or building for the sake of energy efficiency.  391 
Interviews with homeowners revealed that many households favored the look of traditional 392 
brick facades, wanted to preserve bay windows, wanted to keep cornices and architraves, and 393 
expressed a preference for traditional slate and lead roofing. As the study concluded: “every 394 
interviewee regarded at least one aspect of their home as important to preserve, on aesthetic 395 
or heritage grounds,” and that “in all cases there was at least one instance where building 396 
preservation had been prioritized over energy and cost savings.”105 397 
In Japan, retrofits are known to prioritize conspicuousness and social status as much 398 
as they are energy efficiency.  One study discussed a homeowner who had retrofitted his 399 
home with solar panels and LED lights but also four inefficient window air conditioners, 400 
because it marked “social accomplishment and standing.”106 Wilhite and Luzenhiser call this 401 
the “social loading” aspect of Japanese culture, where cultural norms are built into 402 
infrastructure. They argue that Japanese buildings, including retrofits, prioritize air 403 
conditioning because it has become associated with modernity and conceptions of what it 404 
means to be a progressive Japanese family.107  405 
Discussion: Implications for Sustainability and Transitions 406 
In Table 1, we summarize the cultural elements that influence the adoption of the 407 
technologies and practices described in our cases. Material artifacts associated with the cases 408 
are provided as well as norms, values and practices that may help or hinder adoption. The 409 
table shows that regardless of incremental or radical change in technology or practice, culture 410 
plays a key role in adoption.  411 
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Table 1: Culture as material artifacts, norms and values, and practices in low-carbon 412 
transitions  413 
 414 
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 416 
Furthermore, although we treat each of our four innovation and transition cases as 417 
distinct, there are factors that can connect them. This includes spillovers and social 418 
influence—adopters influencing non-adopters—and households that may adopt multiple 419 
innovations.  It is already well known within some of the literature of pro-environmental 420 
behavior and psychology that one of the strongest indicators of future low-carbon practices is 421 
experience or ownership of another existing low-carbon product. That is, for example 422 
adopters of electric vehicles (EVs) are more likely to consider adopting other innovations 423 
such as solar panels or to eat less meat.108  Moreover, those who do whole house retrofits 424 
could also install EV charging or join a car-sharing group, or vice versa. Finally, consumer 425 
research has shown that cultural norms about safety or automotive driving style can be 426 
transmitted or shared across different groups, such as families, friends, or organizations.109 427 
Therefore, our cases interconnect in compelling dimensions. For example, the trend 428 
towards electric, shared and autonomous mobility (i.e. the “three revolutions75,56”).  From a 429 
low-carbon, sociotechnical transition perspective, this combined set of technologies and 430 
practices is optimal due to its positive impact on decarbonisation (when EVs are powered by 431 
green electricity), dematerialization (from fewer cars and road infrastructure), increased 432 
private and public space (from reduced need for parking and possible transformation of 433 
private garages to social spaces) and transportation safety. From a purely economic 434 
perspective, the continued evolution of ridehailing will pull forward the development AVs 435 
through the economic need of TNCs to achieve profitability through the elimination of 436 
drivers. By removing the driver from a vehicle, TNCs stand to recover a significant portion of 437 
the fare that passengers pay (roughly 80% of every Uber fare currently goes to the driver)110 438 
while also eliminating the financial incentives they pay to attract and retain drivers111. 439 
Indeed, “robo-taxis” are expected to be in operation several years before consumer AVs112 440 
and help spur the sizeable potential energy, environmental and sustainability benefits of 441 
AVs.77 As already noted, however, the proliferation of ridehailing needs to be managed to 442 
maximize ridesharing, which is a central element of the noted “three revolutions” in 443 
transportation and an opportunity to reduce life cycle GHG emissions per unit distance 444 
traveled by as much as 90 % relative to the emissions produced by today’s average passenger 445 
vehicle.113 446 
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 As also shown in Table 1, AVs (regardless of whether private or shared) and eco-447 
driving culturally intersect via several material artifacts and practices. For instance, both eco-448 
driving and AVs have EVs in common as a material artifact. EVs are a material artifact of 449 
AVs because they are the natural platform for AVs in the minds of most consumers114 and 450 
because they have low operation and maintenance costs, which will benefit the high 451 
utilization expected for AVs115. Furthermore, eco-driving is a natural practice for AVs 452 
because it results in improved safety and fuel efficiency, thus lowering insurance and energy 453 
costs. 454 
As previously noted, norms and values that relate to environmentalism can spur those 455 
who undertake whole house retrofits to also install EV charging or join a car-sharing group. 456 
Looking forward and as depicted in Figure 3, the environmentally conscious homeowner may 457 
in the future have the opportunity to install EV charging infrastructure that is complimented 458 
by distributed solar energy with battery storage that, at least partially, may come from shared 459 
electric AVs. Consistent with the spillover of environmentally aligned norms and values, the 460 
homeowner that adopts clean energy would potentially see the great benefit of providing a 461 
service that would support clean electrification and sharing of AVs, which are the key aspects 462 
of making widespread AV adoption environmentally sustainable 56. Of course, the 463 
opportunity for revenue generation from shared EV charging makes this concept 464 
economically as well as environmentally sustainable. From this example, it is clear that even 465 
cases without an immediately obvious connection can align through shared norms and values 466 
as well as related material artifacts. 467 
 468 
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Figure 3: Interconnections between Electric Vehicle Adoption, Ridesharing, and 469 
Automated Vehicles  470 
 471 
Source: Authors 472 
From a low-carbon, sociotechnical transition perspective, one may consider a focus 473 
on the radical/substantial changes that bring the greatest benefits, encompass other more 474 
modest/incremental changes and themselves bring about cultural changes that support 475 
transition. As an example of the last point, automakers today provide branding taglines such 476 
as “The Ultimate Driving Machine” (BMW) and “Find New Roads” (GM) that reinforce 477 
norms and practices that negatively impact the adoption of eco-driving, AVs and vehicle 478 
sharing. 116 However, as ridesharing and AVs proliferate, norms, values and practices are apt 479 
to shift away from the thrill of driving and freedom of personal car ownership to the 480 
efficiency, productivity and peace of mind that being driven safely can provide.   481 
As a final point, our research points the way towards a future research agenda 482 
focusing on other elements of culture. For example, our unit of analysis here has been a 483 
particular low-carbon innovation or transition, rather than policy, but analysis that identifies 484 
successful policy interventions related to cultural awareness about sustainability would be 485 
promising to pursue.   This said, successful policy cases studies are not available for radical 486 
technology innovations, such as AVs, when the innovations are still in the development stage. 487 
In the case of AVs, little effort has been dedicated to analyzing how consumer preference for 488 
AV technology, vehicle ownership, and ridesharing might evolve. 77 This is very important 489 
given that the potential environmental benefits of AVs significantly depend on the extent to 490 
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which AVs are shared versus privately owned. Research is needed to identify the factors that 491 
will affect these choices and overcome cultural norms that may lead people to avoid sharing 492 
transportation with strangers, especially if cost differences are insignificant.   493 
Although we show that culture can affect the uptake of technology and that culture 494 
can mediate how technologies are designed, technology itself can also alter cultural attributes 495 
(e.g. practices, norms), and cultural attributes can affect how technology is used (e.g. as 496 
technologies become part of culture).117 118 These themes deserve further analysis. Similarly, 497 
Norgaard 119 writes not only about cultural barriers or practices, as we have done, but other 498 
elements such as cultural toolkits and resources and cultural constructions. Exploring such 499 
toolkits and constructions in the context of sustainability transitions would also be fruitful.  500 
Conclusion and Policy Implications  501 
 Low-carbon energy transitions are not based only or merely on techno-economic 502 
dimensions and considerations. Rather, they are shaped—in positive and negative ways—503 
significantly by culture.  The cultural implications of transitions, however, require new forms 504 
of research, new data, specialized input of local communities and possible reforms to our 505 
energy and climate planning processes.  How can planners and policymakers grapple with 506 
culture in their interventions to support a low-carbon energy transition, underpinned by a 507 
rapidly evolving technology landscape?  We briefly consider policy implications and then 508 
offer three sets of suggestions for three different stakeholder groups: policymakers and 509 
planners, practitioners and researchers of energy development programs.  510 
As previously noted, policy interventions related to cultural awareness about 511 
sustainability are important. Particularly for radical low-carbon innovations, broad adoption 512 
will often require the development of comprehensive and mutually supportive policy 513 
packages to increase the likelihood of public and political acceptability and hence the 514 
likelihood of effective implementation.10. The interconnectivity between our cases 515 
demonstrates this need for integrated policy planning as isolated policies for individual low-516 
carbon technologies and practices can influence the adoption of many others (for better or for 517 
worse). With regard to the development and structuring of policy packages for sustainability 518 
transitions, the literature highlights the need to integrate environmental economics, 519 
innovation studies, and policy sciences perspectives120. Based on the considerations provided 520 
in this paper, we urge a social science/cultural perspective as well. With the case of 521 
ridesharing as an example, in contexts such as the GCC cultural barriers make adoption of 522 
ridehailing, let alone ridesharing, a challenge and hence the barriers need to be proactively 523 
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understood and systematically addressed by policymakers. This consideration of policy 524 
directly feeds into our suggestions for stakeholder groups. 525 
Governments and intergovernmental organizations at local, subnational, national, and 526 
transnational scales—especially those that have ministries, departments, units, or agencies 527 
responsible for statistics on energy, climate, transport and buildings—should begin to collect 528 
more reliable and comprehensive data on culture and cultural trends. While there is no single 529 
format for collecting such data, there are established best practices for collection and 530 
subsequent analysis. 121 For instance, an understanding of the potential cultural barriers and 531 
enablers to adoption of a particular low-carbon energy technology in a given context might be 532 
derived from qualitative interviews, focus groups, observation or even media or content 533 
analysis. The latter mode of data collection can further leverage the growth in social media 534 
for understanding perceptions of energy. 122 In addition to data collection, governments could 535 
stipulate greater community involvement during licensing and permitting discussions so that 536 
cultural bias is minimized.    537 
Energy and climate consultants, program managers, and practitioners have a role to 538 
play as well. They should offer more meaningful consultations with community members and 539 
other stakeholders about their energy services and mobility needs, or their preferences about 540 
climate change mitigation. This should occur before programs are implemented rather than 541 
after they are already being implemented. In addition, their efforts should not focus only on 542 
the criteria of lowering cost (improving affordability) or improving performance (improving 543 
environmental sustainability). Alongside affordability and sustainability, planners should also 544 
strengthen the institutional capacity of community-based organizations to shape or manage 545 
transitions, and directly seek to educate or inform users about the low-carbon or low-energy 546 
technologies they may encounter.  Pragmatically, this suggestion entails moving well beyond 547 
only “post-hoc monitoring” or “after sales service” to directed hands-on training and 548 
maintenance sessions, often on a continual and repetitive basis.  Moreover, rather than 549 
perhaps promoting Western or imported technologies for a particular region, programs could 550 
incentivize more locally designed, culturally acceptable “appropriate technology.”123  This 551 
preference for appropriate technology could push for technology that is designed, 552 
manufactured, and/or owned by stakeholders who better comprehend the cultural dynamics of 553 
the customers they are supposed to serve. 554 
In the research domain, given that culture is a concept that cuts across many academic 555 
disciplines (see Figure 4), we have recommendations that span many different segments of 556 
academia and the professional community.  (Figure 4 also shows how different levels of 557 
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“culture” can interact with each other).  Energy system modelers can be trained in “data 558 
literacy”124 and “algorithmic justice” 16 to become sensitized to cultural diversity and ways to 559 
minimize the types of racial, gender, and cultural biases discussed in this paper.  These same 560 
modelers can be trained to take into consideration expected paces of technical change when 561 
bracketed and bounded by cultural factors. Likewise, research and debate can take place 562 
among political scientists concerning cultures of energy and climate policymaking; among 563 
sociologists concerning the durability of cultural norms and practices related to low-carbon 564 
innovations; and among psychologists concerning cultural decision-making criteria and 565 
values, to name a few.   566 
Figure 4: A research agenda for culture and low-carbon energy transitions  567 
 568 
 569 
Source: Authors, inspired by 125 126 570 
Furthermore, the funders of research or the principle investigators designing projects 571 
could be encouraged to include cultural components and research questions in qualitative 572 
projects that collect data via interviews, focus groups, and other public fora, helping to make 573 
cultural dynamics visible.  Finally, the rapid proliferation of AI across energy and 574 
environment sectors82,127,128 necessitates a broad scientific research agenda to study the 575 
embodiment of culture in the machine behavior of energy and environmental technologies. 576 
Although we’ve specifically considered AI as it relates to AVs, in coming years it’s 577 
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capabilities in prediction, optimization and discovery of insights from data could make it 578 
central to other low-carbon energy activities, such as ridesharing and smart home energy 579 
management.  As a positive development, in recent years researchers have come to 580 
understand the critical importance of adopting social science perspectives in both energy120 581 
and AI research16.  Now is the time to leverage this clarity and bring together 582 
interdisciplinary research efforts to ensure that low-carbon transitions are helped, and not 583 
hindered, by the embodiment of culture as we seek to decarbonize our future homes, 584 
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